adamdhill/accountability.experiments

Files related to experimental study of accountability and regulation

Accountability.experiments

Files related to experimental study of accountability and regulation.

(1) Does delegation undermine accountability?

Abstract from my piece, published in Journal of Empirical Legal Studies:

A small but growing literature in experimental economics finds that principals can shift responsibility for blameworthy behavior to agents, even when those agents are effectively powerless. Prior work in this field measures blameworthy behavior only indirectly, however. It uses modified dictator games to measure attributions of blame for inequitable allocations of wealth. Yet participants might find inequitable allocations of wealth not blameworthy. Thus, such indirect measures leave open the possibility that prior work is not measuring blame shifting at all. This article corrects for a crucial shortcoming by providing a direct measure of blame-shifting behavior. It reports and discusses first-of-its-kind experimental evidence that shows that principals can delegate to powerless intermediaries in order to evade blame.

(2) Does nudging undermine accountability?