opcnz/silverstripe-gpgmailer

The GPG Mailer module improves privacy by allowing emails being sent from SilverStripe CMS to be encrypted and/or signed using GPG public and private keys.

GPG Encryption for SilverStripe Mailer

The GPG Mailer module allows emails being sent from SilverStripe CMS to be encrypted and/or signed using GPG public and private keys. It improves the privacy of email communications sent over standard email protocols and allows recipients of signed emails to ensure the message has been sent from a known sender.

Requirements

• SilverStripe Framework (silverstripe/framework 3.1+)
• PEAR Crypt GPG (pear/crypt_gpg)
• GnuPG binary installed

Known issues

• Only plain text emails can be encrypted

Install

composer require opcnz/silverstripe-gpgmailer

Documentation

See the developer documentation

Maintainers

• Frank Mullenger [email protected]
• Ed Linklater [email protected]

Bugtracker

Bugs are tracked in the issues section of this repository. Before submitting an issue please read over existing issues to ensure yours is unique.

If the issue does look like a new bug:

• Create a new issue
• Describe the steps required to reproduce your issue, and the expected outcome. Unit tests, screenshots and screencasts can help here.
• Describe your environment as detailed as possible: SilverStripe version, Browser, PHP version, Operating System, any installed SilverStripe modules.

Please report security issues to the module maintainers directly. Please don't file security issues in the bugtracker.

silverstripe-gpgmailer's Issues

OpenPGP with HTML susceptible to attack vector

General advisory that OpenPGP is susceptible to attack vectors when used with HTML attachments.

This attack can be performed on an encrypted email that an attacker has collected, including emails that have been sent.

• block all backchannels used in your email clients (only send/receive plain text)
• stay up-to-date with patches from your email client and encryption plugins. Email clients may release a patch to fix this vulnerability once the S/MIME and OpenPGP standards are updated.

We should ensure plain text attachments until this is resolved.

see more info at cert

Keys etc should be configurable via _ss_environment file

We can use environment-specific YAML configuration but _ss_environment is often simpler. We should give people the option of using this.

Suggested in #3.

SS4 compatibility

Any plans on making this compatibile with ss4?